ClaimChain: Improving the Security and Privacy of In-band Key Distribution for Messaging
This addresses security and privacy issues for users of decentralized email encryption systems, offering an incremental improvement over existing methods like Autocrypt.
The paper tackles the security and privacy vulnerabilities in decentralized in-band key distribution for email encryption, such as man-in-the-middle attacks and social graph leakage, by introducing ClaimChain, a cryptographic construction that provides privacy-preserving authentication of public keys with reasonable performance and low overhead.
The social demand for email end-to-end encryption is barely supported by mainstream service providers. Autocrypt is a new community-driven open specification for e-mail encryption that attempts to respond to this demand. In Autocrypt the encryption keys are attached directly to messages, and thus the encryption can be implemented by email clients without any collaboration of the providers. The decentralized nature of this in-band key distribution, however, makes it prone to man-in-the-middle attacks and can leak the social graph of users. To address this problem we introduce ClaimChain, a cryptographic construction for privacy-preserving authentication of public keys. Users store claims about their identities and keys, as well as their beliefs about others, in ClaimChains. These chains form authenticated decentralized repositories that enable users to prove the authenticity of both their keys and the keys of their contacts. ClaimChains are encrypted, and therefore protect the stored information, such as keys and contact identities, from prying eyes. At the same time, ClaimChain implements mechanisms to provide strong non-equivocation properties, discouraging malicious actors from distributing conflicting or inauthentic claims. We implemented ClaimChain and we show that it offers reasonable performance, low overhead, and authenticity guarantees.