Cryptographically Secure Information Flow Control on Key-Value Stores
This addresses security challenges for developers using untrusted key-value stores by automating cryptographic operations, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing IFC and cryptographic techniques.
The paper tackled the problem of enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies on untrusted storage by developing Clio, an information flow control system that transparently integrates cryptography, resulting in a proven secure system with a practical prototype demonstrated through a case study.
We present Clio, an information flow control (IFC) system that transparently incorporates cryptography to enforce confidentiality and integrity policies on untrusted storage. Clio insulates developers from explicitly manipulating keys and cryptographic primitives by leveraging the policy language of the IFC system to automatically use the appropriate keys and correct cryptographic operations. We prove that Clio is secure with a novel proof technique that is based on a proof style from cryptography together with standard programming languages results. We present a prototype Clio implementation and a case study that demonstrates Clio's practicality.