Towards Stabilization of Distributed Systems under Denial-of-Service
Provides theoretical guarantees for networked control systems facing communication attacks, relevant to safety-critical distributed systems.
This paper studies stability of distributed systems under Denial-of-Service attacks, deriving explicit bounds on attack frequency and duration for asymptotic stability under Round-robin scheduling, and proposing a hybrid event-triggered/Round-robin strategy that maintains resilience with lower communication load.
In this paper, we consider networked distributed systems in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the communication network. First, we consider a simple and typical scenario where communication sequence is purely Round-robin and we explicitly calculate a bound of attack frequency and duration, under which the interconnected large-scale system is asymptotically stable. Second, trading-off system resilience and communication load, we design a hybrid transmission strategy consisting of Zeno-free distributed event-triggered control and Round-robin. We show that with lower communication loads, the hybrid communication strategy enables the systems to have the same resilience as in pure Round-robin.