A variational inequality framework for network games: Existence, uniqueness, convergence and sensitivity analysis
Provides theoretical guarantees for equilibrium properties in network games, benefiting researchers studying strategic interactions on networks.
The paper develops a variational inequality framework to analyze Nash equilibria in network games, establishing conditions on network structure (spectral norm, infinity norm, minimum eigenvalue) that ensure existence, uniqueness, convergence, and continuity of equilibrium for games with multidimensional and constrained strategy sets.
We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee existence, uniqueness, convergence and continuity of equilibrium in general network games with multidimensional and possibly constrained strategy sets. We delineate the relations between these conditions and characterize classes of networks that satisfy each of these conditions.