Deep Random based Key Exchange protocol resisting unlimited MITM
This addresses the critical security challenge of key exchange in high-threat environments, though it appears incremental by building on existing Deep Random secrecy concepts.
The authors tackled the problem of secure key exchange against an active Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacker with unlimited computational power by proposing a protocol that combines Deep Random secrecy and universal hashing, proving resistance to interception attacks and ensuring no residual information leakage upon successful completion.
We present a protocol enabling two legitimate partners sharing an initial secret to mutually authenticate and to exchange an encryption session key. The opponent is an active Man In The Middle (MITM) with unlimited computation and storage capacities. The resistance to unlimited MITM is obtained through the combined use of Deep Random secrecy, formerly introduced and proved as unconditionally secure against passive opponent for key exchange, and universal hashing techniques. We prove the resistance to MITM interception attacks, and show that (i) upon successful completion, the protocol leaks no residual information about the current value of the shared secret to the opponent, and (ii) that any unsuccessful completion is detectable by the legitimate partners. We also discuss implementation techniques.