IREXF: Data Exfiltration from Air-gapped Networks by Infrared Remote Control Signals
This addresses a security vulnerability for high-security environments like air-gapped networks, presenting a novel attack vector that is incremental in leveraging existing IoT infrastructure.
The paper tackles the problem of data exfiltration from air-gapped networks by introducing IREXF, a novel infrared optical covert channel that uses a malicious infrared module implanted in a keyboard to transmit data via infrared remote control signals to internet-connected appliances, achieving a rate of up to 2.62 bits per second in experiments.
he technology on infrared remote control is widely applied in human daily life. It is also applied in the place with a top security level. Infrared remote control signal is regarded as a simple, safe and clean resource that can help us control the electrical appliances nearby. In this paper, we build IREXF, a novel infrared optical covert channel from a well-protected air-gapped network via a malicious infrared module implanted previously into a keyboard. A malware preinstalled in the air-gapped PC receives the data from the malicious infrared module to study the infrared surroundings in the air-gapped network. Once a suitable appliance is found, infrared remote control commands will be sent in a proper time. With the development of technology on Internet of Things, more and more electrical appliances can access Internet. Those infrared command signals exfiltrating out of the air-gapped network can be received by an appliance without any malicious configuration. In our experiment, via a smart TV set-top box, the rate of the covert channel can be up to 2.62 bits per second without any further optimization. Finally, we give a list of countermeasures to detect and eliminate this kind of covert channels.