Reliable Intersection Control in Non-cooperative Environments
This addresses intersection management for autonomous vehicles in scenarios with conflicting interests, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing game-theoretic approaches.
The paper tackles the problem of controlling intersections for autonomous vehicles in non-cooperative settings by analyzing strategic behaviors and formulating Nash equilibria, resulting in a strategy-proof mechanism that ensures fair allocation and eliminates incentives for misreporting.
We propose a reliable intersection control mechanism for strategic autonomous and connected vehicles (agents) in non-cooperative environments. Each agent has access to his/her earliest possible and desired passing times, and reports a passing time to the intersection manager, who allocates the intersection temporally to the agents in a First-Come-First-Serve basis. However, the agents might have conflicting interests and can take actions strategically. To this end, we analyze the strategic behaviors of the agents and formulate Nash equilibria for all possible scenarios. Furthermore, among all Nash equilibria we identify a socially optimal equilibrium that leads to a fair intersection allocation, and correspondingly we describe a strategy-proof intersection mechanism, which achieves reliable intersection control such that the strategic agents do not have any incentive to misreport their passing times strategically.