Supersingular Isogeny Oblivious Transfer (SIOT)
This work addresses the need for post-quantum cryptography in secure communication protocols, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing methods without claiming major breakthroughs.
The authors tackled the problem of constructing a post-quantum secure oblivious transfer protocol by combining an existing OT scheme with supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman, resulting in a candidate protocol that demonstrates SIDH's natural support for OT functionality and is analyzed for security in a basic configuration.
We present an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol that combines the OT scheme of Chou and Orlandi together with thesupersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) primitive of De Feo, Jao, and Plût. Our construction is a candidate for post-quantum secure OT and demonstrates that SIDH naturally supports OT functionality. We consider the protocol in the simplest configuration of $\binom{2}{1}$-OT and analyze the protocol to verify its security.