Unobservable False Data Injection Attacks against PMUs: Feasible Conditions and Multiplicative Attacks
For power system security researchers, it reveals new vulnerabilities in PMU-based monitoring that bypass enhanced detection methods.
The paper identifies feasible conditions for unobservable false data injection attacks against PMUs with an enhanced bad data detector, and introduces multiplicative attacks that evade detection by both the enhanced BDD and a prior low-rank decomposition detector, as shown on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system.
This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible conditions under which FDI attacks are unobservable to this enhanced BDD are discussed. In addition, a class of multiplicative FDI attacks that maintain the rank of the PMU measurement matrix is introduced. Simulation results on the IEEE RTS-24-bus system indicate that the these multiplicative unobservable attacks can avoid detection by both the enhanced BDD and a detector based on low-rank decomposition proposed in prior work.