Twisted Gabidulin Codes in the GPT Cryptosystem
This work addresses the challenge of key size efficiency in post-quantum cryptography, representing an incremental improvement over existing GPT variants.
The paper tackles the problem of reducing key sizes in code-based cryptography by investigating twisted Gabidulin codes in the GPT cryptosystem, showing that Overbeck's attack is not feasible for a subfamily and achieving significantly lower key sizes than the original McEliece system and slightly smaller than Loidreau's unbroken GPT variant.
In this paper, we investigate twisted Gabidulin codes in the GPT code-based public-key cryptosystem. We show that Overbeck's attack is not feasible for a subfamily of twisted Gabidulin codes. The resulting key sizes are significantly lower than in the original McEliece system and also slightly smaller than in Loidreau's unbroken GPT variant.