A Security Analysis of IoT Encryption: Side-channel Cube Attack on Simeck32/64
This work addresses security vulnerabilities in IoT encryption, representing an incremental improvement over previous side-channel attacks on this specific cipher.
The paper tackles the security of the Simeck32/64 lightweight block cipher for IoT applications by demonstrating a side-channel cube attack that extracts 32 linearly independent key equations from Hamming weight leakage, improving time and data complexity to 2^35 and 2^11.29 respectively.
Simeck, a lightweight block cipher has been proposed to be one of the encryption that can be employed in the Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Therefore, this paper presents the security of the Simeck32/64 block cipher against side-channel cube attack. We exhibit our attack against Simeck32/64 using the Hamming weight leakage assumption to extract linearly independent equations in key bits. We have been able to find 32 linearly independent equations in 32 key variables by only considering the second bit from the LSB of the Hamming weight leakage of the internal state on the fourth round of the cipher. This enables our attack to improve previous attacks on Simeck32/64 within side-channel attack model with better time and data complexity of 2^35 and 2^11.29 respectively.