Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme
This addresses security vulnerabilities in digital signatures for cryptographic applications, but it is incremental as it builds on existing group and fail-stop signature schemes.
The paper tackles the problem of enhancing group signature security by proposing a Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme that can prove forgery under supercomputer attacks, based on three lemmas to verify authenticity, identify signers in disputes, and demonstrate forgery without key exposure.
In this paper, we propose a Fail-Stop Group Signature Scheme (FSGSS). FSGSS combines the features of the Group Signature and the Fail-Stop Signature to enhance the security level of the original Group Signature. Assuming that the FSGSS encounters an attack by a hacker armed with a supercomputer, this scheme can prove that the digital signature is indeed forged. Based on the above objectives, this paper proposes three lemmas and proves that they are indeed feasible. First, how does a recipient of a digitally signed document verify the authenticity of the signature? Second, when a digitally signed document is under dispute, how can the group's manager find out the identity of the original group member who signed the document, if necessary for an investigation? Third, how can we prove that the signature is indeed forged following an external attack from a supercomputer? Soon, in a future paper, we will extend this work to make the scheme even more effective. Following an attack, the signature could be proved to be forged without the need to expose the key.