Security analysis of a self-embedding fragile image watermark scheme
This exposes security flaws in a specific watermarking method, which is incremental as it critiques an existing approach without proposing a new solution.
The paper identifies vulnerabilities in a self-embedding fragile image watermark scheme, showing it is susceptible to collage attacks and multiple stego-image attacks, with analysis revealing the cost to break it is about (l·b^2)! for given parameters.
Recently, a self-embedding fragile watermark scheme based on reference-bits interleaving and adaptive selection of embedding mode was proposed. Reference bits are derived from the scrambled MSB bits of a cover image, and then are combined with authentication bits to form the watermark bits for LSB embedding. We find this algorithm has a feature of block independence of embedding watermark such that it is vulnerable to a collage attack. In addition, because the generation of authentication bits via hash function operations is not related to secret keys, we analyze this algorithm by a multiple stego-image attack. We find that the cost of obtaining all the permutation relations of $l\cdot b^2$ watermark bits of each block (i.e., equivalent permutation keys) is about $(l\cdot b^2)!$ for the embedding mode $(m, l)$, where $m$ MSB layers of a cover image are used for generating reference bits and $l$ LSB layers for embedding watermark, and $b\times b$ is the size of image block. The simulation results and the statistical results demonstrate our analysis is effective.