Relationships between dilemma strength and fixation properties in coevolutionary games
This work addresses the problem of understanding cooperation dynamics in networked evolutionary games for researchers in theoretical biology and game theory, but it appears incremental as it builds on existing structure coefficient frameworks.
The study investigated how structure coefficients, which determine cooperation outcomes in evolutionary games on networks, relate to dilemma strength scaling in social dilemmas, finding that certain graph arrangements yield large coefficients and significantly expand the parameter space for cooperation.
Whether or not cooperation is favored over defection in evolutionary games can be assigned by structure coefficients for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on any network modeled as a regular graph. We study how these structure coefficients relate to a scaling of dilemma strength in social dilemma games. It is shown that some graphs permit certain arrangements of cooperators and defectors to possess particularly large structure coefficients. Moreover, these large coefficients imply particularly large sections of a bounded parameter plane spanned by scaling gamble-intending and risk-averting dilemma strength.