Contribution of Herv{é} Suaudeau for the mission of the French Senate Law Commission on electronic voting on 25 January 2018
This addresses a critical legal and security problem for policymakers and citizens regarding the feasibility of electronic voting in France, highlighting constitutional incompatibilities.
This paper investigates the compatibility of electronic voting with the French Constitution's requirements for universal, equal, and secret voting, concluding that electronic voting systems cannot guarantee anonymity due to intrinsic vulnerabilities and historical evidence of data exposure.
This contribution investigate the compatibility between the use of dematerialised voting and Article 3 of the french Constitution, which stipulates that 'voting must always be universal, equal and secret'. The IT risk management of electronic voting is managed in a rational way like any other risk management areas. We are therefore prepared to accept the use of a non dematerialised technique to cover a significant, well-identified and unavoidable risk. However, research has shown that a verifiable dematerialized vote intrinsically loses its anonymity. In addition, a study of the history of vulnerabilities shows that no terminal in recent years has been able to guarantee the anonymity of its connection and that personal voting data has always been potentially exposed. Electronic voting systems are therefore, to the best of our knowledge, unable to provide the required constitutional guarantee.