Proving Erasure
This addresses data privacy concerns for users of remote storage services, but it is incremental as it builds on existing quantum protocols and has limited security.
The paper tackles the problem of certifying that a remote hosting service does not leak user data by proposing a quantum-inspired protocol for provable deletion, but it only sketches partial security and shows vulnerabilities to eavesdropping attacks on a few bits.
It seems impossible to certify that a remote hosting service does not leak its users' data --- or does quantum mechanics make it possible? We investigate if a server hosting data can information-theoretically prove its definite deletion using a "BB84-like" protocol. To do so, we first rigorously introduce an alternative to privacy by encryption: privacy delegation. We then apply this novel concept to provable deletion and remote data storage. For both tasks, we present a protocol, sketch its partial security, and display its vulnerability to eavesdropping attacks targeting only a few bits.