Protecting the Protected Group: Circumventing Harmful Fairness
This addresses fairness in classification for self-interested entities, offering a unified framework to prevent harm to protected groups, but it is incremental as it builds on existing fairness notions.
The paper tackles the problem where imposing fairness constraints on self-interested parties, like banks, can worsen outcomes for disadvantaged protected groups, and introduces a Welfare-Equalizing fairness family that includes Demographic Parity and Equal Opportunity, characterizing conditions under which it helps the disadvantaged group and providing an algorithm for optimal classifiers.
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms shape our lives. Banks use them to determine if we are good borrowers; IT companies delegate them recruitment decisions; police apply ML for crime-prediction, and judges base their verdicts on ML. However, real-world examples show that such automated decisions tend to discriminate against protected groups. This potential discrimination generated a huge hype both in media and in the research community. Quite a few formal notions of fairness were proposed, which take a form of constraints a "fair" algorithm must satisfy. We focus on scenarios where fairness is imposed on a self-interested party (e.g., a bank that maximizes its revenue). We find that the disadvantaged protected group can be worse off after imposing a fairness constraint. We introduce a family of \textit{Welfare-Equalizing} fairness constraints that equalize per-capita welfare of protected groups, and include \textit{Demographic Parity} and \textit{Equal Opportunity} as particular cases. In this family, we characterize conditions under which the fairness constraint helps the disadvantaged group. We also characterize the structure of the optimal \textit{Welfare-Equalizing} classifier for the self-interested party, and provide an algorithm to compute it. Overall, our \textit{Welfare-Equalizing} fairness approach provides a unified framework for discussing fairness in classification in the presence of a self-interested party.