On the security of ballot marking devices
This addresses election security for administrators and voters, but it is incremental as it focuses on auditing existing systems rather than introducing new technological solutions.
The paper tackles the problem of ensuring electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs) are secure against malware that could alter printed ballots, proposing that election administrators implement auditing procedures to verify BMD operation while maintaining usability and security comparable to hand-marked paper ballots.
A recent debate among election experts has considered whether electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs) have adequate security against the risks of malware. A malicious BMD might produce a printed ballot that disagrees with a voter's actual intent, with the hope that voters would be unlikely to detect this subterfuge. This essay considers how an election administrator can create reasonable auditing procedures to gain confidence that their fleet of BMDs is operating correctly, allowing voters to benefit from the usability and accessibility features of BMDs while the overall election still benefits from the same security and reliability properties we expect from hand-marked paper ballots.