Security measurement of a medical communication scheme based on chaos and DNA coding
This work exposes critical security flaws in a proposed encryption scheme for medical DICOM images, highlighting risks for healthcare data privacy.
The paper demonstrates that a medical privacy protection scheme (MPPS) based on chaos and DNA coding is insecure by proposing an efficient chosen-plaintext attack that recovers the secret key using only a small number of chosen plain-images, specifically ⌈log256(3·M·N)⌉+4 pairs for an M×N RGB image.
To encrypt sensitive information existing in a color DICOM images, a medical privacy protection scheme (called as MPPS) based on chaos and DNA coding was proposed by using two coupled chaotic systems to produce cryptographic primitives. Relying on some empirical analyses and experimental results, the designers of MPPS claimed that it can withstand a chosen-plaintext attack and some other classic attacking models. However, this statement is groundless. In this paper, we investigate the essential properties of MPPS and DNA coding, and we then propose an efficient chosen-plaintext attack to disclose its equivalent secret-key. The attack only needs $\lceil \log_{256}(3\cdot M\cdot N)\rceil+4$ pair of chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images, where $M \times N$ and ``3" are the size of the RGB color image and the number of color channels, respectively. In addition, the other claimed superiorities are questioned from the perspective of modern cryptography. Both theoretical and experimental results are presented to support the efficiency of the proposed attack and the other reported security faults. The proposed cryptanalysis results will promote the proper application of DNA encoding to protect multimedia privacy data, especially that in a DICOM image.