OpenVoting: Recoverability from Failures in Dual Voting
This addresses the issue of election integrity and efficiency for voting systems, but it appears incremental as it builds on existing dual voting protocols.
The paper tackles the problem of recovering from failures in dual voting systems without re-running entire elections, by proposing OpenVoting, a protocol that identifies a verifiable subset of error-free votes consistent with voter-verified paper records and pinpoints failures with reasons.
In this paper we address the problem of recovery from failures without re-running entire elections when elections fail to verify. We consider the setting of \emph{dual voting} protocols, where the cryptographic guarantees of end-to-end verifiable voting (E2E-V) are combined with the simplicity of audit using voter-verified paper records (VVPR). We first consider the design requirements of such a system and then suggest a protocol called \emph{OpenVoting}, which identifies a verifiable subset of error-free votes consistent with the VVPRs, and the polling booths corresponding to the votes that fail to verify with possible reasons for the failures. To an ordinary voter \emph{OpenVoting} looks just like an old fashioned paper based voting system, with minimal additional cognitive overload.