Policies for constraining the behaviour of coalitions of agents in the context of algebraic information theory
This work addresses coalition behavior in multi-agent systems, but appears incremental as it builds on previous reformulations of game theory.
The paper tackles the problem of designing policies for agents to constrain the behavior of coalitions in games, using algebraic information theory, and demonstrates how these results can be unified with geometric and topological information theory into a cohesive framework.
This article takes an oblique sidestep from two previous papers, wherein an approach to reformulation of game theory in terms of information theory, topology, as well as a few other notions was indicated. In this document a description is provided as to how one might determine an approach for an agent to choose a policy concerning which actions to take in a game that constrains behaviour of subsidiary agents. It is then demonstrated how these results in algebraic information theory, together with previous investigations in geometric and topological information theory, can be unified into a single cohesive framework.