LASCA: Learning Assisted Side Channel Delay Analysis for Hardware Trojan Detection
This addresses hardware security for integrated circuits by enabling Trojan detection without a Golden IC, though it appears incremental as it builds on prior side-channel analysis methods.
The paper tackles Hardware Trojan detection by introducing LASCA, a method that uses a neural network to correlate static timing data with delay information from clock frequency sweeping, achieving close to 90% detection in simulations.
In this paper, we introduce a Learning Assisted Side Channel delay Analysis (LASCA) methodology for Hardware Trojan detection. Our proposed solution, unlike the prior art, does not require a Golden IC. Instead, it trains a Neural Network to act as a process tracking watchdog for correlating the static timing data (produced at design time) to the delay information obtained from clock frequency sweeping (at test time) for the purpose of Trojan detection. Using the LASCA flow, we detect close to 90% of Hardware Trojans in the simulated scenarios.