An authentication protocol based on chaos and zero knowledge proof
This work addresses security and usability challenges in server authentication for network administrators, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing port knocking methods.
The paper tackles the problem of complex and less effective port knocking authentication by proposing Crucible, a stateless protocol that uses chaos-based cryptographic hashes and zero-knowledge proofs, achieving high usability and stealth to protect servers from attacks like port scans and zero-day exploits.
Port Knocking is a method for authenticating clients through a closed stance firewall, and authorising their requested actions, enabling severs to offer services to authenticated clients, without opening ports on the firewall. Advances in port knocking have resulted in an increase in complexity in design, preventing port knocking solutions from realising their potential. This paper proposes a novel port knocking solution, named Crucible, which is a secure method of authentication, with high usability and features of stealth, allowing servers and services to remain hidden and protected. Crucible is a stateless solution, only requiring the client memorise a command, the server's IP and a chosen password. The solution is forwarded as a method for protecting servers against attacks ranging from port scans, to zero-day exploitation. To act as a random oracle for both client and server, cryptographic hashes were generated through chaotic systems.