Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture
This resolves a major conjecture in voting theory and algorithmic decision-making, with applications in social choice and optimization, though it is incremental in advancing known bounds.
The paper tackles the metric distortion problem by developing algorithms that select a point from a set C to minimize total distance to points in V using only ordinal rankings, resolving the conjecture that the optimal deterministic algorithm achieves distortion 3 with a polynomial-time algorithm. It also introduces a randomized algorithm with improved distortion and provides refined bounds using α-decisiveness.
We study the following metric distortion problem: there are two finite sets of points, $V$ and $C$, that lie in the same metric space, and our goal is to choose a point in $C$ whose total distance from the points in $V$ is as small as possible. However, rather than having access to the underlying distance metric, we only know, for each point in $V$, a ranking of its distances to the points in $C$. We propose algorithms that choose a point in $C$ using only these rankings as input and we provide bounds on their \emph{distortion} (worst-case approximation ratio). A prominent motivation for this problem comes from voting theory, where $V$ represents a set of voters, $C$ represents a set of candidates, and the rankings correspond to ordinal preferences of the voters. A major conjecture in this framework is that the optimal deterministic algorithm has distortion $3$. We resolve this conjecture by providing a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves distortion $3$, matching a known lower bound. We do so by proving a novel lemma about matching voters to candidates, which we refer to as the \emph{ranking-matching lemma}. This lemma induces a family of novel algorithms, which may be of independent interest, and we show that a special algorithm in this family achieves distortion $3$. We also provide more refined, parameterized, bounds using the notion of $α$-decisiveness, which quantifies the extent to which a voter may prefer her top choice relative to all others. Finally, we introduce a new randomized algorithm with improved distortion compared to known results, and also provide improved lower bounds on the distortion of all deterministic and randomized algorithms.