Logic, Language, and Calculus
This addresses a foundational gap in logical analysis for computer science, specifically in NLU and NLI, by providing a method to evaluate inference quality, but it appears incremental as it builds on existing insights without introducing a new paradigm.
The paper tackles the problem of distinguishing object-language and metalanguage in computer science, particularly for inferential relations, arguing that metalanguage calculi cannot represent natural language conceptual relations, and presents a logical analysis to assess the normative dimension of inferences.
The difference between object-language and metalanguage is crucial for logical analysis, but has yet not been examined for the field of computer science. In this paper the difference is examined with regard to inferential relations. It is argued that inferential relations in a metalanguage (like a calculus for propositional logic) cannot represent conceptual relations of natural language. Inferential relations govern our concept use and understanding. Several approaches in the field of Natural Language Understanding (NLU) and Natural Language Inference (NLI) take this insight in account, but do not consider, how an inference can be assessed as a good inference. I present a logical analysis that can assesss the normative dimension of inferences, which is a crucial part of logical understanding and goes beyond formal understanding of metalanguages.