Skip to Secure: Securing Cyber-physical Control Loops with Intentionally Skipped Executions
This addresses security and resource efficiency for automotive cyber-physical systems, but appears incremental as it builds on existing monitoring and cryptographic techniques.
The paper tackled securing cyber-physical control loops against adversarial data interventions by proposing intentional skipping of executions as a control-theoretic countermeasure, which reduced cryptographic overhead and resource consumption in automotive systems without compromising performance or safety.
We consider the problem of provably securing a given control loop implementation in the presence of adversarial interventions on data exchange between plant and controller. Such interventions can be thwarted using continuously operating monitoring systems and also cryptographic techniques, both of which consume network and computational resources. We provide a principled approach for intentional skipping of control loop executions which may qualify as a useful control theoretic countermeasure against stealthy attacks which violate message integrity and authenticity. As is evident from our experiments, such a control theoretic counter-measure helps in lowering the cryptographic security measure overhead and resulting resource consumption in Control Area Network (CAN) based automotive CPS without compromising performance and safety.