A Compositional Model of Consciousness based on Consciousness-Only
This work addresses the combination problem of conscious experiences in philosophy and cognitive science, offering a novel mathematical framework that is incremental in its approach.
The authors tackled the problem of modeling consciousness by proposing a compositional framework based on consciousness-only assumptions, where conscious processes are represented as morphisms in a compact closed category composed of co-dependent generators.
Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.