Certificate and Signature Free Anonymity for V2V Communications
This addresses the problem of cumbersome key management and high costs in V2V communications for automotive systems, presenting a novel approach rather than an incremental improvement.
The paper tackles the conflict between anonymity and requirements like non-repudiation in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications by introducing schemes that provide authentication, authorization, anonymity, non-repudiation, replay protection, pseudonym revocation, and forward secrecy without using traditional certificates and signatures, relying instead on number theory hard problems and offering security against colluding malicious parties below a threshold.
Anonymity is a desirable feature for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications, but it conflicts with other requirements such as non-repudiation and revocation. Existing, pseudonym-based V2V communications schemes rely on certificate generation and signature verification. These schemes require cumbersome key management, frequent updating of certificate chains and other costly procedures such as cryptographic pairings. In this paper, we present novel V2V communications schemes, that provide authentication, authorization, anonymity, non-repudiation, replay protection, pseudonym revocation, and forward secrecy without relying on traditional certificate generation and signature verification. Security and privacy of our schemes rely on hard problems in number theory. Furthermore, our schemes guarantee security and privacy in the presence of subsets of colluding malicious parties, provided that the cardinality of such sets is below a fixed threshold.