Game-theoric approach to decision-making problem for blockchain mining
This addresses the strategic participation problem for blockchain miners, but it is incremental as it applies existing game theory to a specific domain.
The paper tackles the decision-making problem for miners in blockchain networks by formulating it as a noncooperative game, showing that Nash equilibria exhibit hysteresis and jump phenomena based on reward changes, and that the reward threshold for non-participation decreases as the number of miners increases.
It is an important decision-making problem for a miner in the blockchain networks if he/she participates in the mining so that he/she earns a reward by creating a new block earlier than other miners. We formulate this decision-making problem as a noncooperative game, because the probability of creating a block depends not only on one's own available computational resources, but also those of other miners. Through theoretical and numerical analyses, we show a hysteresis phenomenon of Nash equilibria depending on the reward and a jump phenomenon of miner decisions by a slight change in reward. We also show that the reward for which miners decide not to participate in the mining becomes smaller as the number of miners increases.