The Counterfactual NESS Definition of Causation
This work provides a more systematic and robust definition of actual causation for researchers in philosophy and AI, particularly addressing issues in preemption.
This paper proposes a new definition of actual causation, the Counterfactual NESS definition, which integrates Wright's NESS definition with a counterfactual difference-making condition. The authors modified their previous definition to weaken the difference-making condition, thereby avoiding problematic analyses in preemption cases.
In previous work with Joost Vennekens I proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that our definition is in fact a formalization of Wright's famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that our definition integrates two highly influential approaches to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify our definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken the difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids the problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach.