What we are is more than what we do
This addresses the philosophical problem of consciousness in AGI for researchers in AI and cognitive science, but it is incremental as it builds on existing debates about functionalism.
The paper argues that consciousness is defined by subjective 'being' rather than functional 'doing', making functional criteria insufficient to determine if a system like artificial general intelligence (AGI) can be conscious, as AGI may replicate human behavior without consciousness.
If we take the subjective character of consciousness seriously, consciousness becomes a matter of "being" rather than "doing". Because "doing" can be dissociated from "being", functional criteria alone are insufficient to decide whether a system possesses the necessary requirements for being a physical substrate of consciousness. The dissociation between "being" and "doing" is most salient in artificial general intelligence, which may soon replicate any human capacity: computers can perform complex functions (in the limit resembling human behavior) in the absence of consciousness. Complex behavior becomes meaningless if it is not performed by a conscious being.