Epistemic Signaling Games for Cyber Deception with Asymmetric Recognition
This work addresses the unrealistic assumption of symmetric recognition in existing signaling games for adversarial decision-making, offering a more precise risk evaluation for cybersecurity applications.
The paper tackles the problem of modeling cyber deception under asymmetric recognition by proposing epistemic signaling games based on the Mertens-Zamir model, which explicitly quantifies players' private beliefs, and analytically characterizes the equilibria of these games.
This study provides a model of cyber deception with asymmetric recognition represented by private beliefs. Signaling games, which are often used in existing works, are built on the implicit premise that the receiver's belief is public information. However, this assumption, which leads to symmetric recognition, is unrealistic in adversarial decision making. For a precise evaluation of risks arising from cognitive gaps, this paper proposes epistemic signaling games based on the Mertens-Zamir model, which explicitly quantifies players' asymmetric recognition. Equilibria of the games are analytically characterized with an interpretation.