The Hammer and the Nut: Is Bilevel Optimization Really Needed to Poison Linear Classifiers?
This work addresses the problem of efficient availability poisoning attacks for linear classifiers, offering a more practical solution for attackers but is incremental as it focuses on a specific model type.
The paper tackles the computational expense of data poisoning attacks on linear classifiers by proposing an efficient heuristic that avoids complex bilevel optimization, achieving comparable or better attack performance with significantly reduced computational cost.
One of the most concerning threats for modern AI systems is data poisoning, where the attacker injects maliciously crafted training data to corrupt the system's behavior at test time. Availability poisoning is a particularly worrisome subset of poisoning attacks where the attacker aims to cause a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. However, the state-of-the-art algorithms are computationally expensive because they try to solve a complex bi-level optimization problem (the "hammer"). We observed that in particular conditions, namely, where the target model is linear (the "nut"), the usage of computationally costly procedures can be avoided. We propose a counter-intuitive but efficient heuristic that allows contaminating the training set such that the target system's performance is highly compromised. We further suggest a re-parameterization trick to decrease the number of variables to be optimized. Finally, we demonstrate that, under the considered settings, our framework achieves comparable, or even better, performances in terms of the attacker's objective while being significantly more computationally efficient.