Towards Certified Analysis of Software Product Line Safety Cases
This addresses safety certification for software product lines, which is critical in safety-critical systems, but it is incremental as it builds on existing single-product analyses.
The paper tackles the challenge of analyzing safety cases for Software Product Lines (SPLs) due to the exponential number of products, by presenting a certified methodology to lift existing single-product safety analyses to product lines, implemented in an interactive theorem prover with a formalized Change Impact Assessment algorithm.
Safety-critical software systems are in many cases designed and implemented as families of products, usually referred to as Software Product Lines (SPLs). Products within an SPL vary from each other in terms of which features they include. Applying existing analysis techniques to SPLs and their safety cases is usually challenging because of the potentially exponential number of products with respect to the number of supported features. In this paper, we present a methodology and infrastructure for certified \emph{lifting} of existing single-product safety analyses to product lines. To ensure certified safety of our infrastructure, we implement it in an interactive theorem prover, including formal definitions, lemmas, correctness criteria theorems, and proofs. We apply this infrastructure to formalize and lift a Change Impact Assessment (CIA) algorithm. We present a formal definition of the lifted algorithm, outline its correctness proof (with the full machine-checked proof available online), and discuss its implementation within a model management framework.