The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols
This provides a formal verification method for cryptographic protocols, addressing security concerns in communication systems, though it is incremental as it builds on existing inductive techniques.
The paper tackles the problem of verifying cryptographic protocols by using inductive definitions to make informal security arguments rigorous, demonstrating that human analysis can take as little as a week with proof scripts running in minutes.
Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using Isabelle/HOL. The human effort required to analyze a protocol can be as little as a week or two, yielding a proof script that takes a few minutes to run. Protocols are inductively defined as sets of traces. A trace is a list of communication events, perhaps comprising many interleaved protocol runs. Protocol descriptions incorporate attacks and accidental losses. The model spy knows some private keys and can forge messages using components decrypted from previous traffic. Three protocols are analyzed below: Otway-Rees (which uses shared-key encryption), Needham-Schroeder (which uses public-key encryption), and a recursive protocol by Bull and Otway (which is of variable length). One can prove that event $ev$ always precedes event $ev'$ or that property $P$ holds provided $X$ remains secret. Properties can be proved from the viewpoint of the various principals: say, if $A$ receives a final message from $B$ then the session key it conveys is good.