Collective Information Security in Large-Scale Urban Protests: the Case of Hong Kong
This research addresses information security challenges for protesters in large-scale urban movements, providing insights into digital tactics in high-risk environments.
The study investigated information security practices among protesters during the Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill protests, finding that they used Telegram for secure communication, organized in small private and large public groups, and developed strategies for pseudonymity and security against arrests.
The Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill protests in Hong Kong present a rich context for exploring information security practices among protesters due to their large-scale urban setting and highly digitalised nature. We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 11 participants of these protests. Research findings reveal how protesters favoured Telegram and relied on its security for internal communication and organisation of on-the-ground collective action; were organised in small private groups and large public groups to enable collective action; adopted tactics and technologies that enable pseudonymity; and developed a variety of strategies to detect compromises and to achieve forms of forward secrecy and post-compromise security when group members were (presumed) arrested. We further show how group administrators had assumed the roles of leaders in these 'leaderless' protests and were critical to collective protest efforts.