Game-Theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents (extended abstract)
This addresses the challenge of modeling moral and other-regarding agents in game theory, offering incremental improvements to existing equilibria concepts.
The paper investigates Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, highlighting problems like computational intractability and miscoordination, and proposes alternative other-regarding equilibria that are computationally tractable and interpolate between self-regarding and Kantian behavior.
We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and problematic extension to general normal form games. We give such a generalization based on concept of program equilibria, and point out that that a practically relevant generalization may not exist. To remedy this we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria that are special cases Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.