On the Differential Cryptanalysis of SEPAR Cipher
This work addresses security verification for lightweight ciphers used in IoT devices, but it is incremental as it builds on previous research.
The paper tackles the problem of confirming the resistance of the SEPAR cipher against differential cryptanalysis, proving that there are enough active S-boxes to provide a tight bound for resistance.
SEPAR is a lightweight cryptographic algorithm, designed to implement on resource-constrained devices especially those employed in IoT environments. Meanwhile, the mixed structure design of cipher leads to speed improvement while guaranteeing its resistance against common cryptographic attacks, especially differential and linear attacks. In order to confirm the resistance of the cipher against differential attack, an extensive investigation was presented in our previous work. In his study, we conduct new research continuing the previously presented research. We prove that there are enough active S-boxes so as to resist cipher against differential cryptanalysis. Moreover, this can provide a tight bound of resisting cipher against this attack.