GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor Measurement Units: Practical Feasibility and Countermeasures
This addresses a critical security vulnerability in power systems that could cripple operations, offering a practical solution for grid operators.
The paper experimentally demonstrates the feasibility of GPS spoofing attacks on phasor measurement units using software-defined radios and introduces a countermeasure based on GPS signal redundancy and LoRa modulation to detect such attacks, providing a ready-to-deploy system.
Prior research has demonstrated that global positioning system (GPS) spoofing attacks on phasor measurement units (PMUs) can cripple power system operation. This paper provides an experimental evidence of the feasibility of such an attack using commonly available digital radios known as software defined radio (SDR). It also introduces a novel countermeasure against such attacks using GPS signal redundancy and low power long range (LoRa) spread spectrum modulation technique. The proposed approach checks the integrity of the GPS signal at remote locations and compares the data with the PMUs current output. This countermeasure is a ready-to-deploy system that can provide an instant solution to the GPS spoofing detection problem for PMUs.