Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help?
This addresses scalability challenges in blockchain systems for developers and users, offering incremental improvements in voting mechanisms for committee-based consensus.
The paper tackles the problem of ensuring honest committees are consistently elected in committee-based consensus (CBC) protocols for scalable blockchains, showing that while optimal voting strategies are intractable, simpler intuitive strategies converge to optimality exponentially quickly in the number of voters, providing robustness and efficiency advantages over staked-weighted lottery protocols.
In the high-stakes race to develop more scalable blockchains, some platforms (Binance, Cosmos, EOS, TRON, etc.) have adopted committee-based consensus (CBC) protocols, whereby the blockchain's record-keeping rights are entrusted to a committee of elected block producers. In theory, the smaller the committee, the faster the blockchain can reach consensus and the more it can scale. What's less clear, is whether such protocols ensure that honest committees can be consistently elected, given blockchain users typically have limited information on who to vote for. We show that the approval voting mechanism underlying most CBC protocols is complex and can lead to intractable optimal voting strategies. We empirically characterize some simpler intuitive voting strategies that users tend to resort to in practice and prove that these nonetheless converge to optimality exponentially quickly in the number of voters. Exponential convergence ensures that despite its complexity, CBC exhibits robustness and has some efficiency advantages over more popular staked-weighted lottery protocols currently underlying many prominent blockchains such as Ethereum.