An analysis of Coggia-Couvreur attack on Loidreau's rank-metric public key encryption scheme in the general case
This work addresses a security vulnerability in cryptographic schemes for cryptographers, but it is incremental as it extends prior results.
The paper demonstrates that when the public key in Loidreau's rank-metric encryption scheme is distinguishable from a random code, the Coggia-Couvreur attack can be extended to recover an equivalent secret key, achieving polynomial-time recovery if the masking vector space has dimension 3.
In this paper we show that in the case where the public-key can be distinguished from a random code in Loidreau's encryption scheme, then Coggia-Couvreur attack can be extended to recover an equivalent secret key. This attack can be conducted in polynomial-time if the masking vector space has dimension 3, thus recovering the results of Ghatak.