Post Quantum Cryptography: Techniques, Challenges, Standardization, and Directions for Future Research
It addresses the critical security problem for cryptography users in a quantum computing era, but is largely a review and incremental in nature.
The paper analyzes the vulnerability of classical cryptosystems to quantum attacks, such as Shor's algorithm breaking RSA and ECC, and discusses post-quantum cryptography families and NIST standardization efforts.
The development of large quantum computers will have dire consequences for cryptography. Most of the symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Grover's search algorithm gives a square root time boost for the searching of the key in symmetric schemes like AES and 3DES. The security of asymmetric algorithms like RSA, Diffie Hellman, and ECC is based on the mathematical hardness of prime factorization and discrete logarithm. The best classical algorithms available take exponential time. Shor's factoring algorithm can solve the problems in polynomial time. Major breakthroughs in quantum computing will render all the present-day widely used asymmetric cryptosystems insecure. This paper analyzes the vulnerability of the classical cryptosystems in the context of quantum computers discusses various post-quantum cryptosystem families, discusses the status of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process, and finally provides a couple of future research directions in this field.