Dynamic Transaction Storage Strategies for a Sustainable Blockchain
This addresses security and sustainability issues for public blockchains like Bitcoin as they transition to transaction-fee-based rewards, though it appears incremental in proposing specific strategies for an existing bottleneck.
The paper tackles the problem of strategic deviations like Selfish Mining threatening blockchain security when transaction fees dominate mining rewards, and demonstrates through simulation that Dynamic Transaction Storage strategies can reduce block incentive volatility to maintain sustainability.
As the core technology behind Bitcoin, Blockchain's decentralized, tamper-proof, and traceable features make it the preferred platform for organizational innovation. In current Bitcoin, block reward is halved every four years, and transaction fees are expected to become the majority of miner revenues around 2140. When transaction fee dominates mining rewards, strategic deviations such as Selfish Mining, Undercutting, and Mining Gap could threaten the integrity and security of the Blockchain. This paper proposes a set of Dynamic Transaction Storage (DTS) strategies for maintaining a sustainable Blockchain under the transaction-fee regime. We demonstrate that block incentive volatility can be reduced through systematic simulation by applying DTS strategies and avoiding strategic deviations. With DTS, public Blockchains such as Bitcoin become sustainable when the mining reward is solely based on the transaction fee.