Forms and Norms of Indecision in Argumentation Theory
This work addresses theoretical gaps in argumentation theory for philosophers and logicians, but it appears incremental as it connects existing philosophical ideas to this domain.
This paper examines how philosophical concepts of indecision can be applied to argumentation theory, aiming to improve understanding of uncertain evidential situations in argument evaluation.
One main goal of argumentation theory is to evaluate arguments and to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected. When there is no clear answer, a third option, being undecided, has to be taken into account. Indecision is often not considered explicitly, but rather taken to be a collection of all unclear or troubling cases. However, current philosophy makes a strong point for taking indecision itself to be a proper object of consideration. This paper aims at revealing parallels between the findings concerning indecision in philosophy and the treatment of indecision in argumentation theory. By investigating what philosophical forms and norms of indecision are involved in argumentation theory, we can improve our understanding of the different uncertain evidential situations in argumentation theory.