How (and Why) to Think that the Brain is Literally a Computer
This work addresses a foundational philosophical and scientific problem for researchers in cognitive science and neuroscience, offering a framework to evaluate computational claims about natural systems like the brain.
The paper tackles the problem of determining whether brains can be considered literal computers by establishing empirical criteria for genuine computation in physical systems, and applies these criteria to argue that the brain likely functions as an analog computer, making the claim both informative and falsifiable.
The relationship between brains and computers is often taken to be merely metaphorical. However, genuine computational systems can be implemented in virtually any media; thus, one can take seriously the view that brains literally compute. But without empirical criteria for what makes a physical system genuinely a computational one, computation remains a matter of perspective, especially for natural systems (e.g., brains) that were not explicitly designed and engineered to be computers. Considerations from real examples of physical computers-both analog and digital, contemporary and historical-make clear what those empirical criteria must be. Finally, applying those criteria to the brain shows how we can view the brain as a computer (probably an analog one at that), which, in turn, illuminates how that claim is both informative and falsifiable.