GLOW: Global Layout Aware Attacks on Object Detection
This addresses the need for more robust adversarial attacks in computer vision, particularly for object detection, though it appears incremental as it builds on existing attack frameworks.
The paper tackles the problem of generating adversarial attacks that can fool object detection systems with consistency checks by proposing GLOW, a method that creates global layout-aware attacks with categorical and geometric constraints. The results show 30% average improvement over state-of-the-art methods for single object attacks and 20% better performance for more generic attacks.
Adversarial attacks aim to perturb images such that a predictor outputs incorrect results. Due to the limited research in structured attacks, imposing consistency checks on natural multi-object scenes is a promising yet practical defense against conventional adversarial attacks. More desired attacks, to this end, should be able to fool defenses with such consistency checks. Therefore, we present the first approach GLOW that copes with various attack requests by generating global layout-aware adversarial attacks, in which both categorical and geometric layout constraints are explicitly established. Specifically, we focus on object detection task and given a victim image, GLOW first localizes victim objects according to target labels. And then it generates multiple attack plans, together with their context-consistency scores. Our proposed GLOW, on the one hand, is capable of handling various types of requests, including single or multiple victim objects, with or without specified victim objects. On the other hand, it produces a consistency score for each attack plan, reflecting the overall contextual consistency that both semantic category and global scene layout are considered. In experiment, we design multiple types of attack requests and validate our ideas on MS COCO and Pascal. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that we can achieve about 30$\%$ average relative improvement compared to state-of-the-art methods in conventional single object attack request; Moreover, our method outperforms SOTAs significantly on more generic attack requests by about 20$\%$ in average; Finally, our method produces superior performance under challenging zero-query black-box setting, or 20$\%$ better than SOTAs. Our code, model and attack requests would be made available.