Consistent Valid Physically-Realizable Adversarial Attack against Crowd-flow Prediction Models
This work addresses security risks in smart city applications by developing a novel adversarial attack method for crowd-flow prediction, though it is incremental as it builds on existing adversarial perturbation research.
The paper tackles the problem of adversarial vulnerabilities in deep learning-based crowd-flow prediction models by proposing CVPR, a consistent, valid, and physically-realizable adversarial attack that explicitly incorporates consistency and validity priors, showing it outperforms adaptive standard attacks in false acceptance rate and adversarial loss metrics.
Recent works have shown that deep learning (DL) models can effectively learn city-wide crowd-flow patterns, which can be used for more effective urban planning and smart city management. However, DL models have been known to perform poorly on inconspicuous adversarial perturbations. Although many works have studied these adversarial perturbations in general, the adversarial vulnerabilities of deep crowd-flow prediction models in particular have remained largely unexplored. In this paper, we perform a rigorous analysis of the adversarial vulnerabilities of DL-based crowd-flow prediction models under multiple threat settings, making three-fold contributions. (1) We propose CaV-detect by formally identifying two novel properties - Consistency and Validity - of the crowd-flow prediction inputs that enable the detection of standard adversarial inputs with 0% false acceptance rate (FAR). (2) We leverage universal adversarial perturbations and an adaptive adversarial loss to present adaptive adversarial attacks to evade CaV-detect defense. (3) We propose CVPR, a Consistent, Valid and Physically-Realizable adversarial attack, that explicitly inducts the consistency and validity priors in the perturbation generation mechanism. We find out that although the crowd-flow models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, it is extremely challenging to simulate these perturbations in physical settings, notably when CaV-detect is in place. We also show that CVPR attack considerably outperforms the adaptively modified standard attacks in FAR and adversarial loss metrics. We conclude with useful insights emerging from our work and highlight promising future research directions.