Player-optimal Stable Regret for Bandit Learning in Matching Markets
This solves an open problem in bandit learning for matching markets, enabling players to maximize profits by targeting optimal stable matchings rather than pessimal ones, with applications in areas like job markets and online platforms.
The paper tackles the problem of achieving player-optimal stable regret in online matching markets, where players learn preferences through interactions, and shows that their algorithm ETGS achieves an upper bound of O(K log T / Δ^2), significantly improving over prior exponential bounds.
The problem of matching markets has been studied for a long time in the literature due to its wide range of applications. Finding a stable matching is a common equilibrium objective in this problem. Since market participants are usually uncertain of their preferences, a rich line of recent works study the online setting where one-side participants (players) learn their unknown preferences from iterative interactions with the other side (arms). Most previous works in this line are only able to derive theoretical guarantees for player-pessimal stable regret, which is defined compared with the players' least-preferred stable matching. However, under the pessimal stable matching, players only obtain the least reward among all stable matchings. To maximize players' profits, player-optimal stable matching would be the most desirable. Though \citet{basu21beyond} successfully bring an upper bound for player-optimal stable regret, their result can be exponentially large if players' preference gap is small. Whether a polynomial guarantee for this regret exists is a significant but still open problem. In this work, we provide a new algorithm named explore-then-Gale-Shapley (ETGS) and show that the optimal stable regret of each player can be upper bounded by $O(K\log T/Δ^2)$ where $K$ is the number of arms, $T$ is the horizon and $Δ$ is the players' minimum preference gap among the first $N+1$-ranked arms. This result significantly improves previous works which either have a weaker player-pessimal stable matching objective or apply only to markets with special assumptions. When the preferences of participants satisfy some special conditions, our regret upper bound also matches the previously derived lower bound.