A probabilistic analysis of selected notions of iterated conditioning under coherence
This work addresses foundational issues in probabilistic logic for researchers in formal logic and AI, but it is incremental as it builds on prior frameworks by Gilio and Sanfilippo.
The paper analyzes iterated conditionals in trivalent logics, showing that existing definitions fail to preserve basic probabilistic properties like the compound probability theorem, and introduces new iterated conditionals as random quantities that satisfy these properties and generalized Bayes' Rule.
It is well know that basic conditionals satisfy some desirable basic logical and probabilistic properties, such as the compound probability theorem, but checking the validity of these becomes trickier when we switch to compound and iterated conditionals. We consider de Finetti's notion of conditional as a three-valued object and as a conditional random quantity in the betting framework. We recall the notions of conjunction and disjunction among conditionals in selected trivalent logics. First, in the framework of specific three-valued logics we analyze the notions of iterated conditioning introduced by Cooper-Calabrese, de Finetti and Farrell, respectively. We show that the compound probability theorem and other basic properties are not preserved by these objects, by also computing some probability propagation rules. Then, for each trivalent logic we introduce an iterated conditional as a suitable random quantity which satisfies the compound prevision theorem and some of the desirable properties. We also check the validity of two generalized versions of Bayes' Rule for iterated conditionals. We study the p-validity of generalized versions of Modus Ponens and two-premise centering for iterated conditionals. Finally, we observe that all the basic properties are satisfied only by the iterated conditional mainly developed in recent papers by Gilio and Sanfilippo in the setting of conditional random quantities.