Are Existing Out-Of-Distribution Techniques Suitable for Network Intrusion Detection?
This work addresses the problem of detecting new network intrusions for security applications, but it is incremental as it applies existing OOD methods to a new domain.
The paper investigates whether existing out-of-distribution (OOD) detection techniques from other fields can effectively identify unknown malicious traffic in network intrusion detection, finding that they can detect a consistent portion of new attacks and that improved embedding spaces enhance detection, with simple detector combinations achieving nearly 100% detection in tested scenarios.
Machine learning (ML) has become increasingly popular in network intrusion detection. However, ML-based solutions always respond regardless of whether the input data reflects known patterns, a common issue across safety-critical applications. While several proposals exist for detecting Out-Of-Distribution (OOD) in other fields, it remains unclear whether these approaches can effectively identify new forms of intrusions for network security. New attacks, not necessarily affecting overall distributions, are not guaranteed to be clearly OOD as instead, images depicting new classes are in computer vision. In this work, we investigate whether existing OOD detectors from other fields allow the identification of unknown malicious traffic. We also explore whether more discriminative and semantically richer embedding spaces within models, such as those created with contrastive learning and multi-class tasks, benefit detection. Our investigation covers a set of six OOD techniques that employ different detection strategies. These techniques are applied to models trained in various ways and subsequently exposed to unknown malicious traffic from the same and different datasets (network environments). Our findings suggest that existing detectors can identify a consistent portion of new malicious traffic, and that improved embedding spaces enhance detection. We also demonstrate that simple combinations of certain detectors can identify almost 100% of malicious traffic in our tested scenarios.